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It is not generally remembered that the first country to reject the Law of the
Sea Convention was the Soviet Union. On April 18, 1982, the Soviet Government
announced that it had enacted the Decree authorizing deep seabed prospecting to
develop mineral resources beyond the limits of the continental shelf and staking
out claims for actual mining activities. At the same time the Government declared
its dissatisfaction with the proposed regulations of the Convention in this partic-
ular area of it provisions.
As the present session centers on the provisions for dispute settlement in the
Convention, all those familiar with Soviet policies must be convinced that the pro-
visions of the Convention's dispute settling scheme were also unacceptable to the
Soviet Union. Indeed, instances of Soviet acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction
for arbitral or judicial settlement of disputes are very rare. They all, except one,
date to the pre-World War II period. After the War there was only one instance of
Soviet submission to a compulsory conciliation procedure-that established by the
Danube Convention of 1948. At that time only socialist countries were parties to
the Convention, and here the Soviet Union could be sure to prevail in a dispute
arising between the parties. It must be noted that there is not a single instance in
which the parties to the Danube Convention resorted to that procedure.'
The basic Soviet Union attitude to international adjudication was expressed
for the first time at the Hague Economic Conference (1922), which considered
Soviet reintegration into the world economy. Maxim Litvinov, speaking for the
Russian delegation, declared that it was impossible to accept a proposal for the
arbitration of disputes involving the ownership of certain enterprises in Russia.
"Only an angel," he said, "would be capable of the necessary impartiality." It was
necessary to face the fact that there was not one world, but two: a Soviet world
and a non-Soviet world. Since there was no third world to arbitrate, he antici-
pated difficulties. One party would put forward a communist judge, while the
other perhaps would propose the Chairman of the League of Nations. None of the
suggestions which had been made so far was acceptable. 2
Accordingly, formal submission of disputes to adjudication was avoided. Some
of the early Soviet agreements with other countries made to liquidate some of the
problems created by World War I provided for good offices and mediation by
individuals or international organizations (such as the Red Cross) (repatriation of
prisoners of war, return of Soviet shipping which sought refuge in foreign ports,
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etc.). An interesting form of mediation was provided for in the Soviet-German
Agreement regarding Soviet ships in Germany. Disputes were to be settled by a
commission consisting of two members appointed by each party. Should the com-
mission be unable to agree on a decision, it was authorized to appoint a neutral
mediator. Similar arrangements were made as regards deals of the early Soviet
trading organization. 3
The only examples of Soviet acceptance of compulsory adjudication were the
Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Distribution of Dangerous Drugs
(July 13, 1931) and the International Opium Convention (1925).
In 1935 the Soviet Union was involved in a dispute with the government of
Uruguay which asserted that the Soviet diplomatic mission fomented unrest and a
communist revolt in Brazil. The Soviet Union declared itself ready to accept
arbitration.
4
In the post World War II period Soviet policy became even more rigid. Third
party adjudication was rejected for ideological reasons. Compulsory adjudication
of international disputes was considered not in tune with the conditions of the
modern international community. Soviet members of the International Law Com-
mission, while emphasizing the prohibition of the use of force in international rela-
tions, thought that compulsory jurisdiction had no place in a community of free
and sovereign states. Sovereignty and independence were a necessity, resulting
from the destruction of capitalist empires, and compulsory jurisdiction would in
effect continue imperialist domination of great powers. Professor Kozhevnikov
was convinced that compulsory jurisdiction "presupposed the existence of a supra-
national authority. The very foundation of existing international law, as an
expression of the will of sovereign states, would thus be called into question."' 5
Professor Tunkin, at present the leading authority in Soviet international juris-
prudence, believed strongly that at that stage compulsory jurisdiction would harm
the development of international law. He supported his view even as regards dis-
putes involving the denunciation of treaties. Among many treaties in force, there
were a number which were a heritage of the colonial system, or had recently been
imposed by the colonial powers on new states. As the new states matured and as
formal independence was transformed into real independence, the social forces
working for peace were bound to rebel against certain treaties concluded earlier.
Where subservient governments had given way to strong ones, the effect of article
25 (draft Convention on Arbitration) would be to place obstacles in the path of
states when they thought to free themselves from onerous and unjust treaties.6
Professor Krylov, another eminent representative of the Soviet science of inter-
national law and judge of the International Court of Justice, thus states the Soviet
case: "Arbitration has played a great and honorable role in the history of interna-
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tional relations, but compulsory arbitration was fast disappearing and was now to
all intents and purposes accepted only by a small number of states."7
The only area where the Soviet Union was willing to consider submission of its
disputes to an impartial body were disputes regarding the validity and fulfillment
of international contracts. In a number of navigation treaties the Soviet Union has
agreed to submit its ships in foreign ports to the jurisdiction of local courts. In the
abortive US-USSR trade agreement of 1972 the Soviet Union agreed to compul-
sory commercial arbitration as agreed by the participants of a trade contract,
accepting also submissions of disputes to commercial arbitration organized in the
third countries.
Two other examples of Soviet attitudes to dispute settlements in recent agree-
ments are the provisions on dispute settlement contained in agreements with the
United States and Norway. The U.S. Agreement on Consideration of Conflicts
Resulting from Damage to Fishing Vessels or Gear and Measures to Prevent
Fishing Conflicts provided for the creation of two Dispute Settling Boards con-
sisting of four members, two from each party. Unanimous decisions of the Board
are binding. In case of disagreement, the Board makes a report in which views of
each member are expressed. The dispute is then settled by negotiation. 8
Another example of limited Soviet support of institutional and compulsory dis-
pute settlement is the International Maritime Satellite Organization
(INMARSAT), which was set up by two agreements. The main INMARSAT
Convention provided for its organization, purpose, governing bodies, and adminis-
tration. The other was a detailed operational agreement, which may be signed not
only by states, but also by the participating organizations which were to provide
the meteorological service for the ships. The Soviet Union is represented on the
operational level by an organization which is similar to our Comsat. Disputes
arising on the level of the constitutional convention are subject to facultative arbi-
tration, in which parties must agree to submit their disputes to an arbitral tri-
bunal. Disputes on the operative level, arising between the service organizations,
are subject to compulsory adjudication on the model of commercial arbitration.
Also disputes arising between the signatories arising under separate agreements
(unless otherwise provided) are subject to compulsory jurisdiction. 9
The present pattern of Soviet acceptance of compulsory dispute settling is thus
clear. The Soviet government may be brought before an international arbitral
tribunal or international court only upon its agreement in each separate case. It
has yet to happen. Somehow strong Soviet disapproval of compulsory jurisdiction
has escaped attention (even among the LOS Conference participants). In 1978 the
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Soviet press carried a strongly worded statement of the Soviet delegation
regarding the compulsory conciliation in the Convention of UNCLOS 1II. It was
also disregarded.
